School Tracking and Access to Higher Education Among Disadvantaged Groups by Ofer Malamud & Cristian Pop-Eleches
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We would like to thank Thomas Lemieux, Steve Pischke, and Miguel Urquiola. All errors are our
own. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Ofer Malamud and Cristian Pop-Eleches. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.School Tracking and Access to Higher Education Among Disadvantaged Groups
Ofer Malamud and Cristian Pop-Eleches




When students are tracked into vocational and academic secondary schools, access to higher education
is usually restricted to those who completed an academic track. Postponing such tracking may increase
university attendance among disadvantaged students if additional time in school enables them to catch
up with their more privileged counterparts. However, if ability and expectations are fairly well set
by an early age, postponing tracking during adolescence may not have much effect. This paper exploits
an educational reform in Romania to examine the impact of postponing tracking on the proportion
of disadvantaged students graduating from university using a regression discontinuity (RD) design.
We show that, although students from poor, rural areas and with less educated parents were significantly
more likely to finish an academic track and become eligible to apply for university after the reform,
this did not translate into an increase in university completion. Our findings indicate that simply postponing
tracking, without increasing the slots available in university, is not sufficient to improve access to
higher education for disadvantaged groups.
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The relationship between family background and access to higher education is a robust em-
pirical ￿nding across many countries.1 Yet there is debate about whether this relationship is
mostly predetermined at an early age or can be mediated through investments in schooling.
Carniero and Heckman (2002, 2004) argue that long-run factors shape ability and expec-
tations early on and therefore emphasize the importance of early childhood investments.
On the other hand, Krueger (2004) contends that the return to human capital investments
remains high even beyond adolescence, and especially for those from less advantaged family
backgrounds. But how important is age? Can the relationship between family background
and access to higher education be in￿ uenced by the timing of educational transitions in
secondary school? This paper exploits a unique educational reform in Romania which post-
poned when students were tracked into academic and vocational schools in order to examine
whether such later tracking improves access to higher education among socio-economically
disadvantaged children.2
The Romanian educational reform, which occurred in 1973, prevented students from
entering vocational schools after only 8 years of schooling and, instead, required them to
receive an additional two years of academic curricula. Due to this policy change, students
born after January 1, 1959 were more likely to complete an academic high school curriculum
as compared to their counterparts who were born immediately before this date. By increasing
1Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) provide evidence from thirteen countries at various levels of development.
2In earlier work, we focused on whether the increased exposure to general education in academic schools
a⁄ected labor market outcomes later in life (Malamud and Pop-Eleches, 2010). We provided evidence
that the educational reform did not lead to an increase in average years of schooling or an increase in the
proportion of students completing university. In this paper, we focus on access to higher education among
socio-economically disadvantaged students.
1the fraction of students who completed academic high school, the reform also increased the
proportion of students who became eligible to apply to university, while the number of
mandated university slots remained unchanged. Using data from the Romanian Census, we
employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design to show that students from poor and rural
regions and from less educated families, who were less likely to complete university, were
also those most a⁄ected by the policy. However, although these disadvantaged students did
become signi￿cantly more likely to be eligible for university after the reform, this did not
translate into a relative increase in university attendance and graduation.3 If more time
in academic schools had enabled disadvantaged students to catch up with their privileged
counterparts, delaying the timing of tracking should have increased university completion
among the disadvantaged. Instead, our ￿ndings indicate that simply postponing tracking,
without increasing the number of slots available in university, is not su¢ cient to improve
access to higher education for disadvantaged students.
Many countries track pupils into academic and vocational schools at some point during
their secondary education. Some countries, such as Austria, Germany, and Hungary track
students as early as age 10, while others, such as the United States, have traditionally had
relatively little tracking across schools even at older ages. One of the main arguments for
tracking is that it is easier to teach a homogenous group of students.4 On the other hand,
the possibility of positive spillover e⁄ects from more able to less able students is a common
argument against tracking. Early tracking may also be ine¢ cient when ability is measured
3University drop-out rates during this period in Romania were so low that attendance and completion
were essentially identical (Braham, 1978).
4Du￿ o, Dupas, and Kremer (forthcoming) argue that this explains the positive bene￿ts associated with
a (within-school) tracking intervention Kenya.
2with noise because some students may end up assigned to the wrong track (Brunello, Gian-
nini, and Ariga, 2006). For Germany, Dustmann (2004) shows that parental background is
strongly related to the secondary track choice of the child, and to subsequent educational
achievements. Based on this evidence, Dustmann suggests that early tracking may explain
the low levels of intergenerational mobility in Germany. Nevertheless, in the absence of any
exogenous variation in the timing of tracking, it is di¢ cult to provide truly compelling ev-
idence. Manning and Pischke (2006) evaluate several studies in England and Wales which
estimate the e⁄ect of moving from a system of extensive tracking to one with comprehen-
sive schools on academic achievement but conclude that selection bias is a serious threat to
validity and urge caution when interpreting results.5 In a cross-country setting, Hanushek
and W￿ssman (2006) ￿nd evidence that tracking raises educational inequality but Waldinger
(2006) argues that these results are not particularly robust to alternative speci￿cations. Tak-
ing advantage of the unique educational reform in Romania, we use a regression discontinuity
design to address the possibility of omitted variable bias and selection bias. Importantly, al-
though Romania￿ s labor market under Communism was structured rather di⁄erently from
those in other countries, the education system was actually quite similar to many systems
with explicit constraints on the number of university slots and competitive entry into high
school and university.
We also contribute to a growing literature which examines the impact of educational
reforms in postwar Europe, and Scandinavia in particular. Meghir and Palme (2005) examine
a Swedish reform which increased compulsory schooling, abolished selection, and introduced
5Maurin and McNally (2007) examine a more recent educational reform in 1989 that widened access to
the academic track in Northern Ireland.
3a nationally uni￿ed curriculum. Exploiting a period of experimentation across municipalities
during the 1950s, they ￿nd that the reform increased educational attainment and earnings
for students from low SES families. Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage (2010) examine a similar
reform in Norway which extended compulsory schooling, introduced comprehensive schools
and established a common curriculum in the 1960s. Although they focus on estimating
returns to schooling, they also ￿nd that the reform increased the probability of attending
university and weakened the e⁄ect of family background on the likelihood of participating in
higher education. Pekkarinen, Uusitalo, and Pakkala (2009) show that an analogous reform
in Finland signi￿cantly decreased the intergenerational income elasticity. Nevertheless, it is
di¢ cult to isolate the e⁄ect of tracking in the earlier work because most of the educational
reforms a⁄ected both the amount of education and the timing of selection. In the case of
Romania, average years of schooling attained by students remained the same before and
after the 1973 educational reform.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background of the Romanian
educational system and the 1973 educational reform. Section 3 describes these data and the
empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
6The increase in years of schooling among who became eligible for university by completing high school
was o⁄set by a reduction in years of schooling by students who left before completing high school (and no
longer acquired additional vocational education).
42 Background
2.1 Education in Romania
Apart from the changes induced by the 1973 reform, the structure of education in Romania
throughout the 1970s was relatively stable. Students began compulsory schooling by entering
schools of general education (scoal… a de cultur… a general… a) at the age of 6. More speci￿cally,
students entered grade 1 in September of the year following the calendar year in which
they reached 6 years of age. Since the mid-1950￿ s, these schools o⁄ered 8 years of general
education, nominally composed of primary education from grades 1 to 4 and gymnasium
education from grades 5 to 8.7 Prior to the educational reforms of 1973, students who
graduated from schools of general education entered vocational schools and apprenticeship
programs or continued onto academic secondary school lyceums, where entry was based on
competitive exams.
The main types of academic secondary schools included the theoretical lyceums (licee
teoretice si real-umaniste) which were the most selective, as well as industrial lyceums (licee
industriale), teacher training lyceums (licee pedagogice), economic lyceums (licee economice),
agricultural lyceums (licee agricole). All lyceums operated at two distinct levels. The ￿rst
level corresponded to grades 9 and 10 of compulsory general education, while the second level
o⁄ered general education in grades 11 and 12. Curriculum in the ￿rst level was essentially
homogenous across lyceums:
￿During the ￿rst 2-years of lyceum education, students are o⁄ered a basically uniform
curriculum both in academic and practical subjects whatever the character or orien-
tation of a lyceum, its stated aims are to o⁄er a well-balanced integrated curriculum
7Some general schools also included grades 9 and 10 (ciclul superior de 2 ani), usually as branches of
secondary school lyceums.
5composed of a number of subjects in the humanities, social studies, and the sciences,
as well as subjects related to practical training in a particular ￿eld.￿ (Braham, 1978,
p. 10)
Graduates from the ￿rst level of lyceum who did not take further courses in the second
level received a certi￿cate of graduation from 10-year compulsory education (ceri￿cat de ab-
solvire a ￿nv… at… am￿ntului obligatoriu de 10 ani). Admission to the second level was based on
a composite score computed from academic achievement in the lower level and a competi-
tive entrance exam. Graduates from the second level who passed the baccalaureate exam
received the baccalaureate diploma (diploma de bacalaureat) while those who failed received
a certi￿cate of graduation (certi￿cat de absolvire). The vast majority of students enrolled in
the second level of lyceum did pass the baccalaureate exam.
Vocational schools (‚ scoli profesionale) provided training in numerous trades ranging from
aircraft maintenance to winemaking. They also operated at two levels: a lower vocational
track for students who had completed 8 years of general education and an upper vocational
track for students who had received an additional two years of general education in the ￿rst
level of lyceum. The length of training varied by trade and depending on whether students
completed an additional two years of general education: ￿In 1967-68 vocational schools
o⁄ered training in 232 trades, 175 of which required 3 years and 57, 2 years￿(Braham, 1972,
p. 73).
Entrance to higher education in universities, institutes, academies and conservatories
was open to graduates of the second level of lyceum schools and required a baccalaureate
diploma.8 Universities were under the central control and supervision of the Ministry of
8In addition, technical schools for master craftsmen admitted graduates of vocational schools who had
spent between 3 and 5 years in production. A small number of postsecondary specialization schools admitted
graduates of lyceums and trained them in specialized ￿elds, but these were abolished in 1977.
6Education, which also determined the number of openings at the di⁄erent universities in
accordance with current and projected needs. During the 1960s, the number of university
slots expanded rapidly so that enrollment in 1968-69 was more than double that in 1960-
1961 (Braham, 1972). However, the number of slots remained roughly constant throughout
the 1970s. At that time, Romania had 42 institutions of higher education which o⁄ered
degrees varying from a minimum of 3 years for teacher training to a maximum of 6 years
for medicine. Admission to university was open to all graduates of secondary education
holding a baccalaureate diploma and entry was based on a competitive oral and written
exams administered in July of each year. Successful applicants were selected solely based on
the scores achieved on these exams, subject to the predetermined quotas at each university
(Braham, 1972). In contrast to the baccalaureate exam, university entrance exams were
much harder to pass and it was not uncommon for a student to re-apply for a number of
years before being admitted. Once accepted, students very rarely dropped out of university
so attendance and graduation rates were very similar.
Thus, in most respects, the educational system in Romania was quite comparable to those
which existed (and continue to exist) in many other countries. Schools followed a national
curriculum and entry into high schools and universities was constrained with admission based
on competitive exams. Although the Communist labor market of the 1970s was associated
with a highly compressed wage structure, attending a prestigious lyceum or university was
considered an extremely desirable outcome. Even under Communism, higher education
bestowed social status and allowed entry into the more highly valued professional jobs. As
a result, we believe that the ￿ndings of this study may be applicable to other settings where
the number of university slots is constrained.
72.2 The Educational Reform of 1973
The educational reforms of 1973, consisting of Decree No. 278 and the Resolution of the
Communist Party￿ s Central Committee of June 18 and 19, 1973, were intended to increase
the proportion of students with 10 years of general schooling. In particular, the Resolution
of June 1973 stated that ￿beginning with the school year 1974-75, the entire graduating
class of grade 8 will start in grade 9 of lyceums; vocational schools will no longer accept
students from this class [grade 8] directly.￿ 9 Thus, these reforms prevented students from
entering vocational schools after 8 years of general education and required them to enter the
￿rst level of lyceum schools instead. The structures of the educational system before and
after the change in 1973 are depicted in Figure 1. Depending on their aptitudes, skills, and
preferences, graduates of the ￿rst level of lyceum schools could (i) enter the workforce, (ii)
continue to vocational school for 1 year, or (iii) continue to grades 11 and 12 in the second
level of lyceum schools. The emphasis on additional general education after 1973 caused a
marked decrease in the prevalence of vocational training. As one secondary source explains,
the number of students in vocational schools ￿decreased during the 1970￿ s because of the
extension of compulsory education to include 2 years in the lyceum.￿(Braham, 1978, p. 11)
The Resolution of June 1973 also introduced measures to assure that su¢ cient quali￿ed
teachers and school resources (such as science laboratories, classrooms, and dormitories) were
allocated to local authorities. In most cases, these measures did not require any physical
movement of resources; teachers and schools remained the same but their training and the
curriculum were changed. Speci￿cally, the 1973 Resolution stated that:
9These excerpts from the Resolution of the Communist Party￿ s Central Committee of June 18 and 19,
1973 are translated by the authors from the original Romanian text.
8￿In order to provide for an e⁄ective educational environment and to use the existing
facilities e¢ ciently,...lyceums will, in general, function within the same premises as
vocational schools and under the same leadership.￿
Since most students who were prevented from entering vocational schools after grade 8 in
the fall of 1974 were placed in the ￿rst level of lyceum within existing vocational schools,
they remained with mostly similar peer groups in grades 9 and 10. With some expansion
of the second level of lyceums after the reform, the marginal student who entered this track
may have been exposed to slightly better peers, on average, during the ￿nal two years of
secondary school. However, as seen in Figure 2, the largest increase in lyceum enrollment
was in the somewhat less selective industrial high schools. Thus, while the marginal student
who graduated from a lyceum rather than a vocational school due to the policy change was
probably exposed to better peers, the increase in peer quality was likely limited because
of the already high level of sorting in di⁄erent types of lyceums before and after the 1973
reform.10
We can document some of these changes using aggregate data from the Annual Statistics
of the Socialist Republic of Romanian. Figure 3 shows the large decline in the number of
students enrolled in vocational schools and on-the-job apprenticeships between the school
years 1973-74 and 1975-76. During this period, enrollment in lyceums increased sharply, as
shown in Figure 4. At the same time, the number of teachers in vocational schools fell and
the number of teachers in lyceums rose in the initial years following the educational reform.
Further evidence for these dramatic changes comes from the Romanian Census of 1992.
Since students began their compulsory schooling at age 6, they would have completed grade
10The e⁄ect of changing peer groups on avarage educational attainment and other outcomes would be
essentially zero in the presence of linear peer e⁄ects. However, since we are interested in access to higher
education among disadvantaged groups, any potential change in peer groups could explain our ￿ndings.
98 by age 14 and grade 10 by age 16. As a result, students born in 1958 would have been
una⁄ected by the policy while those students born in 1959 would have been required to
continue to grades 9 and 10 of lyceum schools. Figure 5 shows the highest educational
attainment by year of birth for individuals from the Romanian Census of 1992. There is
a sharp decline in the proportion of individuals with vocational training between cohorts
born in 1958 and 1959. At the same time, we observe a sharp increase in the proportion of
individuals who complete the ￿rst level (grades 9-10) and second level (grades 11-12) of a
general lyceum education. No such discontinuity is observed for the proportion completing
only lower/primary or those completing university. This is consistent with the historical
evidence that the supply of slots at Romanian universities did not change for the cohorts
a⁄ected by the 1973 educational reform.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
The primary dataset for the empirical analysis combines two independent random samples
from the 1992 Romanian Census.11 For each respondent, the census collected basic socioe-
conomic characteristics (such as gender, region of birth, rural/urban indicator of birth) and
detailed information about the highest level of educational attainment. Education levels
are classi￿ed as follows: primary education, gymnasium education, ￿rst stage of lyceum
education (grade 9 and 10), second stage of lyceum education (grades 11 and 12), voca-
11These include a 15% sample from the Population Activities Unit (PAU) of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE) and a 10% sample from IPUMS International. We have veri￿ed that these
two samples are two separate random draws from the universe of all responses.
10tional training and apprenticeships, post-secondary education, and university education.12
Two features make this dataset especially useful for our analysis: First, with approximately
90,000 observations in each yearly birth cohort, we have su¢ cient power to employ a regres-
sion discontinuity design. Second, there is detailed information about the month and year
of birth so we can identify the discontinuity induced by the policy within a relatively narrow
window.
A number of the individual and parental background indicators serve as important mark-
ers of social class. Among these, whether an individual was born in a rural or urban setting
is a particularly relevant indicator in Romania, whose economy prior to World War II was
primarily oriented towards agriculture, and where rural status continued to be an important
social issue in Romania during the transition period (Florian and Serbanescu, 1998). We
also de￿ne a dummy variable indicating whether an individual was born in one of the 20
(out of 41) poorest regions of the country, as measured by regional GDP in the 1990￿ s. In
addition, we interact the two preceding variables to construct an indicator of being born
in a rural locality of a poor region. Finally, we consider indicators for whether each of the
parents has only a primary or no education. When examining parental characteristics, we
have to restrict our attention to those individuals who are still in the same household as their
parents. Although this sample is not completely representative of the overall population, we
have tested that the probability of living with a parent is not a⁄ected by the educational
reform.13
12Note that, since these categories are mutually exclusive, we cannot determine whether students with
vocational training and apprenticeships also completed the ￿rst stage of lyceum education.
13Regression discontinuity estimates for the probability of residing with either the mother or father using
our main speci￿cations are all statistically insigni￿cant (not shown here).
11Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample used in the study (i.e. all individ-
uals in cohorts born between 1956 and 1961): approximately 27 percent complete vocational
training, 4 percent complete 9th and 10th grade in the ￿rst level of lyceum, and 27 per-
cent complete 11th and 12th grade in the second level of lyceum. Over 9 percent graduate
from university while only 1 percent of students complete some other form of post-secondary
training. Summing the last three categories, we determine that almost 38 percent of students
were eligible by law to apply for entrance into university (including, of course, those who
actually completed university). Roughly 72 percent of the sample is rural born, indicat-
ing that Romania was a predominantly rural country even through the late 1950s. Finally,
parental educational is very low, with 50 percent of fathers and 64 percent of mothers having
received only a primary education or no education at all. Note that all these background
characteristics, including gender, are very similar between the pre-reform and post-reform
cohorts (not shown here).
3.2 A Regression Discontinuity Design
We take advantage of the 1973 educational reform in order to estimate the e⁄ect of postpon-
ing tracking. Since this reform went into e⁄ect during the 1974-75 school year and students
entered grade 1 in September after the calendar year in which they reached 6 years of age,
those individuals born before January 1, 1959 were una⁄ected by the policy while those born
after this date had their tracking postponed. With detailed information on date of birth, we
can estimate the impact of this policy using a regression discontinuity design.
We ￿rst examine the e⁄ect of the 1973 educational reform on educational attainment. Our
12primary educational outcomes include (a) eligibility to apply to university and (b) university
graduation. We consider the following regression equation:
_ = ￿
0X + ￿ +  () +  (1)
where X includes ￿xed e⁄ects for calendar month of birth to control for seasonal di⁄erences
between individuals born in di⁄erent months.  is equal to 1 if individual  was
born on or after January 1, 1959 and 0 if born on or before December 31, 1958. Finally,
 () is a function of date of birth, which is the forcing variable in this context. As in many
recent studies employing this technique and as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008),
we specify a ￿ exible parametric model by including higher order polynomials of date of
birth.14 We consider speci￿cations that use linear, quadratic and cubic trends in month of
birth, as well as linear, quadratic, and cubic splines (i.e. trends where the month of birth is
fully interacted with ).15 All binary outcome variables are estimated using a linear
probability model but we have also veri￿ed that non-linear regression methods, such as logit
and probit, yield similar results.
Next, we examine how the 1973 educational reform changed the composition of students
from certain social classes who were (a) eligible to apply to university, or who (b) graduated
from university. To answer this question, we consider the following regression model:
_ = ￿
0X + ￿ +  () + ￿ (2)
14See Dinardo and Lee (2004) for use of parametric functions in regression discontinuity design. Lee and
McCrary (2005) and Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2008) speci￿cally use parametric functions of date of birth.
15Estimating this equation using non-parametric methods, along the lines of Hahn, Todd, and van der
Klaauw (2001) also leads to similar results.
13where all of the right-hand side variables are de￿ned as in equation 1, and _ is
one of our ￿ve markers of social class based on personal and parental background charac-
teristics: (i) rural/urban place of birth, (ii) born in poor region, (iii) born in poor region in
rural locality, (iv) mother has only primary education or less and (v) father has only primary
education or less. We run this regression for the sample of students who are eligible for uni-
versity and for the sample who complete university. Consequently, in this speci￿cation, the
coe¢ cient on  indicates the e⁄ect of the reform on the proportion of disadvantaged
students eligible for university or graduating from university. We also report an alternative
set of speci￿cations where we estimate equation 1 for eligibility to university and graduating
from university while restricting the sample to di⁄erent disadvantaged groups.
Our regression-discontinuity (RD) approach essentially compares the outcomes of indi-
viduals in cohorts a⁄ected by the 1973 educational reform to their counterparts in cohorts
born too early to be a⁄ected. We use a three year window on either side of the cuto⁄, in-
cluding all individual born between January of 1956 and December 1961. The choice of the
window is somewhat arbitrary as we need to strike a balance between the advantages of hav-
ing more precise estimates with larger windows and mitigating the possibility of confounding
time e⁄ects with more narrow windows. Therefore, we also present robustness checks where
use broader and narrower windows. All regressions cluster on month of birth in order to
avoid the problems associated with speci￿cation error in the case of discrete covariates (Lee
and Card, 2007).
144 Results
4.1 E⁄ect of the reform on educational attainment
The 1973 reform had a dramatic e⁄ect on the level and type of educational attainment,
shown in Figure 5. As mentioned previously, the reform forced students to enter vocational
school after 10 years of schooling and therefore required them to receive an additional 2
years of general education. The reform also increased the number of slots in academic high
schools for the remaining two years (in grades 11 and 12). Table 2 provides precise estimates
for the impact of the reform on several di⁄erent educational outcomes, corresponding to
equation 1 from the preceding section. The rows show the coe¢ cient on  using
alternative polynomial trends. Column (1) indicates that children born after January 1959
were between 7 and 10 percentage points less likely to receive a vocational education. Given
that the base probability of receiving a vocational education during this period was about
0.27, this represents an extremely large e⁄ect. Columns (2) and (3) reveal that students
who were shifted out of vocational schools ended up completing their education in academic
schools instead. The larger increase was among students who completed grades 11-12 in
academic lyceums, and thereby became eligible to apply for university. On the other hand,
columns (4) and (5) indicate that the 1973 reform had only a small e⁄ect on post-secondary
educational attainment and virtually no e⁄ect on university graduation.16 Eligibility for
university includes students who completed all four years of academic lyceums, as well as
those who actually went on to complete a post-secondary or university education. Column (6)
16Figure 1 makes clear that the importance of post-secondary education is relatively small and diminshed
even further after the reform. Moreover, the coe¢ cient on  in column (4) is only signi￿cant in
certain speci￿cations.
15shows that the 1973 reform increased eligibility for university by approximately 5 percentage
points, or over 13 percent, regardless of which polynomial trend is used to control for the
forcing variable.
These results are consistent with our understanding of the educational system in Roma-
nia and the speci￿c reform in 1973: The policy change switched a large fraction of students
from vocational to academic schools. As a result, many more students were able to take the
baccalaureate exam at the end of high school and become eligible to take the entrance exam
at one of the nation￿ s state universities. However, this did not translate into an increase in
overall university graduation because the number of university slots were constrained by the
government and remained unchanged during our period of study. Figure 6 plots the propor-
tion of individuals eligible for university and the proportion of individuals graduating from
university by month and week of birth. As expected, Panels A and C show an extremely
sharp discontinuity after January, 1959 (normalized as month 0) for those eligible for univer-
sity. Individuals born merely two weeks apart had very di⁄erent likelihoods of being eligible
for university. No such discontinuity can be observed for the fraction of students completing
university in Panels B and D.
Note that the 1973 reform did not lead to increases in overall educational attainment.
While there was an increase in the number of students who continued to grades 11 and 12 in
academic lyceums and thereby became eligible for university, there was also an increase in the
number of students who completed only 10 years of schooling. Using data from Romanian
LSMS household surveys in 1995 and 1996 to estimate the impact of the 1973 reform on
years of schooling, we found insigni￿cant e⁄ects ranging from about 0.02 to 0.09 years of
16schooling.17 Thus, the net e⁄ect of the 1973 educational reform on years of schooling was
essentially zero from both a statistical and substantive perspective.
4.2 E⁄ect of the reform on access to higher education
Having established that the 1973 educational reform increased the overall fraction of students
eligible to apply to university, we consider the impact of the reform on the socio-economic
composition of students eligible to apply for university. Table 3 presents regression results
for the sample of students eligible to apply for university, corresponding to equation 2 from
the previous section. Column (1) indicates that the 1973 educational reform increased the
proportion of eligible students who were born in a rural region by approximately 4 percentage
points, using any number of di⁄erent polynomial trends. Similarly, column (2) shows that the
proportion of eligible students who were born in a poor region increased by over 2 percentage
points. Combining these two dependent variables, column (3) reveals that the proportion of
eligible students who were born in poor and rural regions increased by almost 3 percentage
points, or 10 percent of the mean.
The e⁄ect of the policy on social composition in terms of parental education is even more
striking.18 Columns (4) and (5) display the e⁄ect on the proportion of eligible students
whose mother or father had a minimal level of educational attainment. In either case, the
estimated impact of the educational reform on the proportion of individuals with less edu-
cated parents is large and highly signi￿cant. Figure 7 also reveals a sharp discontinuous jump
17These results are similar to those for men in Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2010).
18As mentioned earlier, the sample of individuals still living with their parents is not necessarily repre-
sentative of the overall population. However, the probability of living with one￿ s parents does not reveal a
discontinuity around the birth cohort cuto⁄ suggesting this is not a concern given our design.
17in the proportion of eligible students who come from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds
according to all ￿ve markers of social class.19 We interpret these results as evidence that
the marginal person a⁄ected by the reform came from a lower social class than the average
person who was eligible to apply for university. In other words, the reform increased the
likelihood that children from less advantaged backgrounds would complete an academic high
school and have the opportunity to apply for university.
We proceed to examine whether the increase in eligibility for university among disadvan-
taged students led to an increase in the probability of graduating from university. Figure 8
displays the proportion of university graduates who were born in rural regions, poor regions,
rural and poor regions, as well as those whose mother or father have especially low levels of
educational attainment. This graph is analogous to Figure 7 but with the sample restricted
to students who graduated from university. In contrast to the patterns for eligibility, we
do not observe any discontinuities in the composition of social class for university gradua-
tion. These ￿ndings are con￿rmed in Table 4 which shows that the estimated coe¢ cients
on  are essentially zero for almost all of our alternative speci￿cations. The e⁄ects
are somewhat less precisely estimated in the case of parental education due to sample size
and with the inclusion of some higher order polynomial trends. Nevertheless, the pattern
is consistent across all markers of social class. The 1973 educational reform made students
from disadvantaged background relatively more likely to be eligible for university but this
did not translate into a increase in the proportion of disadvantaged students completing
19The open circles plot residuals from regressions of the dependent variables on ￿xed e⁄ects for calendar
month of birth, to eliminate seasonal di⁄erences. The solid lines are ￿tted values to residuals from regressions
of the dependent variable on a quadratic polynomial in month of birth.
18university.20
We also considered alternative speci￿cations in which we estimated the e⁄ects of the
1973 reform on eligibility for university and graduation from university separately for each
of the ￿ve disadvantaged groups. Appendix Table 1 indicates that the e⁄ect of the reform
on the probability of becoming eligible for university is generally larger for those who are
more disadvantaged. In contrast, Appendix Table 2 reveals that the educational reform
did not increase the probability of actually attending university for either disadvantaged or
non-disadvantaged students. These estimates largely con￿rm the ￿ndings from the main
speci￿cations in the paper.
Finally, we attempted to calculate the ￿implied￿ e⁄ect of the 1973 reform on univer-
sity attendance for disadvantaged students based on the rates of university attendance from
earlier cohorts. Using newly available data from the 1977 Romanian Census, we estimated
the probability of attending university for students who had completed di⁄erent types of
lyceums just prior to the 1973 educational reform (i.e. cohorts born 1954 to 1958).21 Then
we multiplied the these probability by the increase in enrollment of disadvantaged students
in each type of lyceum. The overall ￿implied￿e⁄ect of the 1973 reform on university atten-
dance were approximately 0.008 for individuals from rural and from poor regions and 0.007
for individuals with less-educated parents. In most cases, we could reject these ￿implied￿
e⁄ects from the estimated coe¢ cients of university attendance in Appendix Table 2. Thus,
if disadvantaged students who became eligible for university due to the 1973 reform would
20In addition, we examined whether the 1973 reform had a di⁄erential e⁄ect on males and females. Ap-
pendix Table 3 shows that the reform increased the proportion of males who became eligible for university
but did not change in the proportion of males actually going to university.
21Rates of university attendance were 25 percent in theoretical lyceums, 19 percent in industrial lyceums,
and substantially lower in most other types of lyceums.
19have been able to take full advantage of this opportunity, we would have expected to see
much larger e⁄ects on university attendance.
4.3 Robustness checks
We have performed a number of additional tests to check the robustness of our results.
Appendix Table 4 examines the sensitivity of the e⁄ects on eligibility for university. Panel
A presents three alternative windows around the discontinuity: a one year window including
students born between 1958 and 1959, a two year window including students born between
1957 and 1960, and a four year window including students born between 1955 and 1962. As
in Table 3, the e⁄ect of the 1973 educational reform on the proportion of eligible students
from disadvantaged backgrounds is highly signi￿cant in each of these speci￿cations. Panel
B presents estimates for alternative year cuto⁄s; i.e. ￿placebo experiments￿around January
1 of the two preceding years and two following years. We ￿nd essentially no signi￿cant
di⁄erences in the proportion of eligible students from disadvantaged backgrounds using these
alternative year cuto⁄s around January 1 of 1957, 1958, 1960 and 1961.22 Appendix Table 5
examines the sensitivity of the e⁄ects on university graduation. Panel A indicates that there
are no signi￿cant di⁄erences in the proportion of university graduates from disadvantaged
backgrounds using either broader or narrower windows around the discontinuity. Panel B
shows that there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the proportion of university graduates from
disadvantaged backgrounds using alternative year cuto⁄s. We have also con￿rmed that the
analogous ￿placebo￿experiments for the e⁄ect of the 1973 reform on educational attainment
22Note that we use a one year window for all the placebo experiments to minimize the contamination of
our estimates with the actual reform that came into e⁄ect for those born in 1959.
20in Table 2 are generally insigni￿cant (results not shown).
4.4 Quality of education
As noted earlier, the competitive nature of entry into secondary education resulted in sub-
stantial sorting of students by socioeconomic background. Hence, even before the educational
reform, it is likely that students from disadvantaged backgrounds were enrolled in schools
with less able peers. These schools may have also drawn teachers from lower parts of the
ability distribution. Though the reform would have increased the average quality of peers for
the marginal student a⁄ected, the evidence suggests that most of the a⁄ected students at-
tended the less prestigious industrial high schools. Therefore, the postponement of tracking
probably did not drastically increase the quality of peers or schools for these disadvantaged
students but, rather, opened up the opportunity to complete an academic track in high
school and apply to university.
The drastic expansion of general education in Romania so essential to credibly identifying
the e⁄ect of vocational training may have also caused a short-run reduction in the quality of
academic education. Moreover, with an educational reform that a⁄ected such a large fraction
of the school-age population, the question of how resources were allocated to implement
the reform becomes extremely important. As mentioned previously, the 1973 educational
reform involved the reorganization of existing vocational schools which were transformed
into ￿combo schools￿o⁄ering both vocational and general high school education. Figures 2
and 3 show the in￿ ux of teachers from vocational to general high school and indicate that
the average student/faculty ratios across the two types of schools were largely maintained.
21Although we have some anecdotal evidence that retraining occurred, these teachers may
nevertheless have been relatively inexperienced at teaching the new curriculum. Nevertheless,
in a related paper, we provide evidence that changes in the quality of academic schools were
unlikely to explain the absence of e⁄ects on labor market outcomes in later years. (Malamud
and Pop-Eleches, 2010)
5 Conclusion
Whether the relationship between family background and access to higher education can be
in￿ uenced by the timing of educational transitions in secondary school is an important ques-
tion for human capital policy. This paper examines an educational reform in Romania which
postponed the timing of tracking into academic and vocational schools. As a result, the pro-
portion of students who became eligible to apply to university increased sharply, even while
the number of university slots remained unchanged. Using data from the Romanian Census,
we show that students from poor, rural areas and from less educated families who were less
likely to complete university, were those most a⁄ected by the policy. These disadvantaged
students were signi￿cantly more likely to become eligible to apply for university after the
reform, suggesting that certain disadvantaged students were able to catch up to some de-
gree with their more privileged counterparts in school. However, we ￿nd no corresponding
increase in their relative likelihood of university attendance and graduation, indicating that
the postponement of tracking did not help disadvantaged students catch with their more
privileged counterparts in getting access to higher education.
How do we interpret these ￿ndings? Although Romania￿ s labor market under communism
22was structured rather di⁄erently from those in most countries today, the education system
was actually quite similar to most systems with a national curriculum and competitive
entry into high school and university. Moreover, the presence of explicit constraints on
the number of university slots is common in many countries where the central government
funds higher education directly.23 Consequently, our ￿ndings may apply to other countries
and other contexts where the number of university slots is relatively scarce. If more time
in academic schools had enabled disadvantaged students to catch up with their privileged
counterparts, postponing the timing of selection should have increased university completion
among the disadvantaged. Instead, our ￿ndings suggest that simply postponing tracking,
without increasing the number of slots available in university, was not su¢ cient to improve
access to higher education. It is plausible that simply providing disadvantaged students with
the opportunity to apply to university could have had an e⁄ect on university completion.
That we do not ￿nd any e⁄ect is striking evidence to the contrary.
23Indeed, there is also evidence of supply-side constraints in the United States where there is relatively
less public funding of higher education (Bound and Turner, 2006).
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Figure 1: Structure of Education in Romaina
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Source:
1992 CensusFigure 6: Proportion Eligible and Graduating from University
Notes:  All panels are restricted to individuals born between January 1, 1956 and December 31, 
1961. Panels A and C measure the proportion of individuals who achieved an educational attainment 
that allows them to apply for entrance at a university. Panels B and D measure the proportion of 
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Panel D: University GraduateFigure 7: Eligibility to Apply to University (by Month of Birth)
Notes:  All panels are restricted to individuals who achieved an educational attainment that allows them to apply 
for entrance at a university and who are born between January 1, 1956 and December 31, 1961. The solid lines 
are fitted values from regressions of the dependent variable on a quadratic polynomial in month of birth. The 
open circles are residuals from regressions of the dependent variable on 11 calendar month dummies. 
































































































Panel E: Father Primary SchoolFigure 8: Actual Graduation from University (by Month of Birth)
Notes:  All panels are restricted to individuals who graduated from university and who are born between January 
1, 1956 and December 31, 1961. The solid lines are fitted values from regressions of the dependent variable on a 
quadratic polynomial in month of birth. The open circles are residuals from regressions of the dependent variable 


























































































Panel E: Father Primary SchoolTable 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD N
Educational Attainment
Vocational 0.27 0.45 448636
General 9-10 0.04 0.19 448636
General 11-12 0.27 0.44 448636
Post secondary 0.01 0.12 448636
Eligible for University 0.38 0.48 448636
University Graduate 0.09 0.28 448636
Background Characteristics
Rural Born 0.72 0.45 449991
Born Poor Region 0.51 0.50 450156
Born Rural and Poor Region 0.40 0.49 449991
Mother Primary Education 0.64 0.48 86928
Father Primary Education 0.50 0.50 65447
Male 0.50 0.50 450156
Notes: SD is the standard deviation and N is the sample size. All summary statistics based on all 
individuals born between 1956 and 1961 (within 3 years of January 1, 1959). Source: 1992 Romanian 
Census.
Entire sampleTable 2: Reduced-form estimates for the effect of the 1973 educational reform on educational outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.093*** 0.026*** 0.050*** 0.001 0.051*** -0.001
[0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]
-0.092*** 0.026*** 0.049*** 0.001* 0.050*** -0.001
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]
-0.080*** 0.020*** 0.046*** 0.002** 0.045*** -0.003*
[0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002]
-0.092*** 0.026*** 0.050*** 0.001** 0.050*** -0.001
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]
-0.076*** 0.018*** 0.044*** 0.002*** 0.043*** -0.004*
[0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001] [0.005] [0.002]
-0.067*** 0.016*** 0.047*** 0.003** 0.049*** -0.002
[0.006] [0.002] [0.007] [0.001] [0.007] [0.003]
Cal. month dummies YYYYYY
Sample Size 448,636 448,636 448,636 448,636 448,636 448,636
Mean of dep. variable 0.27 0.04 0.27 0.01 0.38 0.09
CUBIC
LINEAR SPLINE
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions are clustered by month of birth. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
Samples include cohorts born between January 1, 1956 and December 31, 1961. The dependent variables are defined in Table 1. AFTER is defined as 1 for individuals born on or 
after January 1, 1959 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1958.   All regressions include 11 calendar month dummies. 











QUADRATICTable 3: Reduced-form estimates for the effect of the 1973 educational reform on eligibility to attend university by different groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.038*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.049*** 0.042***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.010] [0.009]
0.037*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.046*** 0.042***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.009]
0.041*** 0.024** 0.028*** 0.071*** 0.050***
[0.006] [0.009] [0.007] [0.010] [0.013]
0.035*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.046*** 0.042***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010]
0.041*** 0.023** 0.029*** 0.076*** 0.051***
[0.007] [0.010] [0.008] [0.012] [0.015]
0.039*** 0.023* 0.033*** 0.048** 0.049**
[0.012] [0.013] [0.010] [0.020] [0.022]
Cal. month dummies YYYYY
Sample Size 169,339 169,450 169,339 31,638 24,557
Mean of dep. variable 0.58 0.45 0.32 0.42 0.27
QUADRATIC SPLINE
CUBIC SPLINE
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions are clustered by month of birth. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
Samples include cohorts born between January 1, 1956 and December 31, 1961 who achieved an educational attainment that allows them to apply for entrance at a university. The 
dependent variables are defined in Table 1. AFTER is defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1959 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1958. All 












EducationTable 4: Reduced-form estimates for the effect of the 1973 educational reform on actual attendance of university by different groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.002 0.005 0.003 -0.016 0.018
[0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.016] [0.015]
0.004 0.005 0.003 -0.017 0.017
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.016] [0.015]
0.016 0.018 0.008 0.003 0.011
[0.016] [0.013] [0.014] [0.022] [0.021]
0.003 0.005 0.003 -0.018 0.017
[0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.016] [0.015]
0.016 0.022 0.008 0.013 0.01
[0.017] [0.015] [0.016] [0.026] [0.023]
-0.024 0.013 -0.02 0.001 0.015
[0.022] [0.020] [0.020] [0.042] [0.032]
Cal. month dummies YYYYY
Sample Size 40,065 40,135 40,065 8,326 6,631





Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions are clustered by month of birth. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
respectively. Samples include cohorts born between January 1, 1956 and December 31, 1961 who graduated from university. The dependent variables are defined in Table 1. 











EducationAppendix Table 1: Reduced-form estimates for the effect of the 1973 educational reform on eligibility to attend university by different groups
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.045*** 0.056*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.058*** 0.024** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.051***
[0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.012] [0.006] [0.010] [0.008]
0.044*** 0.056*** 0.046*** 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.058*** 0.024** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.051***
[0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.012] [0.006] [0.010] [0.008]
0.029*** 0.054*** 0.042*** 0.049*** 0.040*** 0.054*** 0.011 0.062*** 0.047*** 0.051***
[0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.014] [0.008] [0.013] [0.010]
0.045*** 0.056*** 0.047*** 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.058*** 0.024** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.051***
[0.006] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.012] [0.006] [0.010] [0.007]
0.022*** 0.054*** 0.041*** 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.053*** 0.009 0.064*** 0.048*** 0.051***
[0.008] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.016] [0.009] [0.015] [0.011]
0.030* 0.058*** 0.043*** 0.055*** 0.041*** 0.062*** 0.034 0.055*** 0.069** 0.062***
[0.015] [0.006] [0.009] [0.011] [0.007] [0.010] [0.024] [0.014] [0.028] [0.016]
Cal. month dummies YYYYYYYYYY
Sample Size 127,496 320,977 221,589 227,047 267,567 180,906 31,089 55,515 32,637 32,545




















Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions are clustered by month of birth. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Samples 
include cohorts born between January 1, 1956 and December 31, 1961. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for having achieved an educational attainment that allows a child to 
apply for entrance at a university. AFTER is defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1, 1959 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1958.   All regressions 













Rural BornAppendix Table 2: Reduced-form estimates for the effect of the 1973 educational reform on actual attendance of university by different groups
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.015* -0.002 0.005 0.004
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.002] [0.009] [0.003]
0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.015* -0.002 0.005 0.004
[0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.002] [0.009] [0.003]
-0.006 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.017 0.002 0.010 0.002
[0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.010] [0.003] [0.011] [0.004]
0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.015* -0.002 0.005 0.004
[0.004] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.002] [0.009] [0.003]
-0.007 -0.001 -0.006* -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.019 0.003 0.014 0.002
[0.006] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.012] [0.004] [0.012] [0.005]
0.008 -0.005 -0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.007 0.017 0.002 0.022 0.005
[0.007] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.014] [0.007] [0.016] [0.007]
Cal. month dummies YYYYYYYYYY
Sample Size 127,496 320,977 221,589 227,047 267,567 180,906 31,089 55,515 32,637 32,545



























Rural Born Rural Born Born Poor 
Region
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions are clustered by month of birth. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Samples 
include cohorts born between January 1, 1956 and December 31, 1961. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for having graduated from university. AFTER is defined as 1 for 
individuals born on or after January 1, 1959 and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31, 1958.   All regressions include 11 calendar month dummies. Regressions are restricted to 
children with certain background variables, which are defined in Table 1. 
LINEAR SPLINE
QUADRATIC SPLINE














Cal. month dummies YY
Sample Size 169,450 40,135
Mean of dep. variable 0.48 0.54
Sample: actual attendance of 
university




Sample: eligibility to attend 
university
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions are clustered by month of birth. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. Samples include cohorts born between January 1, 1956 and December 31, 
1961 who achieved an educational attainment that allows them to apply for entrance at a university (column 1) and who graduated 
from university (column 2). The dependent variables is an indicator variable for being male. AFTER is defined as 1 for individuals 




CUBIC SPLINE(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.045** 0.028** 0.039*** 0.053*** 0.061***
[0.016] [0.011] [0.012] [0.019] [0.018]
0.041*** 0.020** 0.025*** 0.057*** 0.053***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.012] [0.011]
0.042*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.049*** 0.035***
[0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008]
1957 0.007 0.012 0.011 -0.009 0.049**
[0.016] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.018]
1958 0.011 0.001 0.008 0.004 0.031**
[0.016] [0.015] [0.012] [0.021] [0.012]
1959 0.045** 0.028** 0.039*** 0.053*** 0.061***
[0.016] [0.011] [0.012] [0.019] [0.018]
1960 -0.008 0.019 0.016 -0.010 0.001
[0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.016] [0.019]
1961 0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.027 0.006




Notes: Robust standard errors are provided in brackets. All regressions are clustered by month of birth. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent level respectively. In Panel B, samples include cohorts born one year on either side of the cutoff. The dependent variables are defined in 
Table 1.  All regressions include a quadratic in month of birth and calendar of month dummies, except for the 1 year window which only includes a quadratic 
in month of birth. AFTER is defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1 of the respective year and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31 
of the previous respective year.
Panel B: Placebo year cutoffs
Panel A: Alternative windows
Appendix Table 4: Robustness checks for eligibility to attend university





Education(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.010 0.023 0.012 -0.004 0.026
[0.029] [0.018] [0.020] [0.036] [0.027]
0.011 0.011 0.002 -0.019 0.007
[0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.021] [0.019]
0.011 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.020
[0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.014] [0.013]
0.012 -0.001 0.012 -0.037 0.036
[0.026] [0.023] [0.022] [0.043] [0.022]
0.003 0.008 0.013 -0.007 -0.013
[0.023] [0.021] [0.020] [0.039] [0.026]
0.010 0.023 0.012 -0.004 0.026
[0.029] [0.018] [0.020] [0.036] [0.027]
0.011 0.004 0.018 0.007 0.035
[0.027] [0.022] [0.021] [0.028] [0.021]
0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.033 -0.042**
[0.027] [0.018] [0.013] [0.021] [0.020] 1961
Notes: Robust standard errors are provided in brackets. All regressions are clustered by month of birth. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent level respectively. In Panel B, samples include cohorts born one year on either side of the cutoff. The dependent variables are defined in 
Table 1.  All regressions include a quadratic in month of birth and calendar of month dummies, except for the 1 year window which only includes a quadratic 
in month of birth. AFTER is defined as 1 for individuals born on or after January 1 of the respective year and 0 for individuals born on or before December 31 
of the previous respective year.
1959




Appendix Table 5: Robustness checks for actual attendance of university






Panel A: Alternative windows
1 year window
2 year window
4 year window